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The article focuses on the measurement of a relevant component of the human capital, the managerial ability (MA). 
Quantifying MA is central to management literature. Prior research indicates that manager speciﬁc features (ability, 
talent, reputation, or style) affect economic outcomes but, in management literature, most of the measures used in 
archival research also reﬂect signiﬁcant aspects of the ﬁrm that are outside of management’s control. The article aims 
to ﬁnd a measure, better than existing ones, which allows distinguishing the effect of the manager from the effect of 
the ﬁrm in creating ﬁrm value. The article uses the “two-stage SFA-DEA” approach, in which both Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are used to estimate the efﬁciency scores ﬁrms adopt to 
derive a measure of MA. The idea is to obtain a measure of MA as a residue of the inefﬁciency equation of SFA 
and to use it as a new input to insert in the “second/third” DEA stage. Italian banks have been chosen as the sample 
to investigate and implement the model. The differences in results with or without this new MA measure provide 
evidence of the existence of this contribution. The originality of the article consists in the proposition of a new model 
to measure MA, which outperforms the alternative measures, simple to use as it is based on easily obtainable ﬁnancial 
data and available for a broad cross section of ﬁrms, so opening the door to a wide array of studies previously difﬁcult 
to conduct. 
INTRODUCTION
Managing IC efﬁciently (that is, managing and
transforming various intangible resources to create
or maximize value) is considered the key to sustain
competitive edge for each kind of organization
(Kujansivu, 2009; Kweh et al., 2013; Veltri &
Bronzetti, 2015). The measurement of intellectual
capital (IC) and its contribution to the ﬁrm’s value
is one of the central theme of the IC literature, since
from the pioneering article of Bontis (1998)
(Andrikopoulos, 2010; Booker et al., 2008; Dumay,
2014; Serenko & Bontis, 2004; Veltri, 2012). Several
are the measurement method proposed and used in
literature, both quantitative and qualitative (Pulic,
2000; Veltri, 2014). Nonetheless, there is no consen-
sus on IC measurement (Dumay, 2014; Uziene,
2010), and many frameworks have been criticized
as they focus on single dimension on IC, without
taking into consideration the complex process of
IC efﬁciency management, and to be subjective
(Feroz et al., 2003). Recently, data envelopment
analysis (DEA), a non-parametric approach, has be-
come fashionable in the IC management research
(e.g. Campisi & Costa, 2008; Kweh et al., 2014a;
Lu & Hung, 2011; Lu et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2006;
Yang & Chen, 2010), also because DEA allows mul-
tiple inputs and multiple outputs to be evaluated
concurrently without requiring prior information
about the relationship among multiple performance
measures and interactions among various perfor-
mance measures in an objective way (Alfano and
D’Orio, 2002).
In this study, the authors also employ DEA to
evaluate the IC efﬁciency management, but this
study is different from others using DEA to measure
IC (Kweh et al., 2013; Leitner et al., 2005; Yalama &
Coskun, 2007) for two main reasons. The ﬁrst reason
is that the paper do not use just the DEA approach,
but a more complex approach, in which both sto-
chastic frontier approach (SFA) and DEA are used
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2to estimate the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency scores and to derive
a measure of the managerial ability (MA).1
The second reason is that the focus of the paper is
not on the overall IC, but on a relevant component
of the human capital, the MA, and in detail the
aim of the paper is to ﬁnd a measure, better than
existing ones, that allows distinguishing the effect
of the manager from the effect of the ﬁrm in creating
ﬁrm value.
Quantifying MA is a central theme for manage-
ment literature. Prior research indicates that
manager speciﬁc features (ability, talent, reputation,
or style) affect economic outcomes and are therefore
important to economics, ﬁnance, accounting,
management, and IC research as well as to practice.
Prior research is limited to measures such as
media coverage and historical returns, which are
difﬁcult to attribute solely to the manager versus
the ﬁrm (Rajgopal 2006), or manager ﬁxed effects,
where there is evidence of a manager-speciﬁc effect,
but the quantiﬁable effect is limited to managers
who switch ﬁrms (e.g. Bertrand & Schoar, 2003;
Bamber et al., 2010; Ge et al., 2011).
The main aim of the paper instead, coherently
with Demerijan et al. (2012), is to provide a more
precise MA measure than the existing measures
(i.e. to exhibit better an economically signiﬁcant
manager-speciﬁc component), but at the same time
containing less noise than existing proxies of MA.
The paper addresses its aims by applying an
approach stemming from the three-stage estimation
(Fried et al., 2002) but more sophisticated than this,
hereafter “two-stage SFA-DEA” approach. This
method consists of estimating the frontier and the
inefﬁciency equation simultaneously at the ﬁrst
stage when SFA is set up. We used the SFA speciﬁ-
cation proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) that
allows the constraints of the “two-step” approach
to be avoided. In this way, the ﬁrst and the second
stages proposed by Fried et al. (2002) are incorpo-
rated in a single one, and the efﬁciency scores are es-
timated through a parametric method which takes
into account also a random error and not only the
inefﬁciency detracting from the frontier as in DEA.
The idea behind the paper is to obtain anMAmea-
sure as a residue of the inefﬁciency equation and to
use it as a new input to insert in the second stage
when DEA are used. Italian banks have been chosen
as the sample to investigate and implement the
model, as the banking industry has been the object
of several studies employing DEA methodology
(Battese et al., 2000; Casu et al., 2004; Seiford & Zhu,
1999).
The originality of the paper consists in the propo-
sition of a new model to measure MA, which out-
performs the alternative measures of MA, simple
to use as it is based on easily obtainable ﬁnancial
data and available for a broad cross section of ﬁrms.
We believe that our MA score exhibits an economi-
cally signiﬁcant manager-speciﬁc component and
contains less noise than existing proxies of MA. This
more precise measure of ability opens the door to a
wide array of studies that previously were difﬁcult
to conduct.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The impact of management on ﬁrm performance is
a topic of enduring interest in the managerial litera-
ture. There are several proxies used in the literature
to measure MA. Some studies refer to broader mea-
sures to proxy the MA, such as the prior industry-
adjusted stock returns (Fee & Hadlock, 2003), the
CEO’s ﬁnancial press visibility and the ﬁrm’s prior
industry-adjusted return (Rajgopal et al., 2006), and
a combination of CEO tenure, prior media men-
tions, appointment from outside of the ﬁrm, and
prior industry-adjusted stock returns (Milbourn,
2003). Other studies (Carter et al., 2010; Tervio,
2008) used executive pay to infer MA. A number
of studies proxy MA looking at the market reac-
tions, such as Hayes and Schaefer (199), which iden-
tify able managers as those who were hired away by
another ﬁrm, and Bennedsen et al. (2010), which ex-
amine ﬁrm proﬁtability following the death of a
CEO. Several studies, ﬁnally, rely on manager ﬁxed
effects as measure of CEO ability, such as Bertrand
and Schoar (2003), Bamber et al. (2010), and Ge
et al. (2011). Anyway, all of the above examined
measures lack precision and often rely on infrequent
events.
Studies using DEA are characterized by the aim
to provide a more precise measure of MA. Among
these, Murthi et al. (1996, 1997) measure MA in the
industry sector, Barr and Siems (1997) and Leverty
and Grace (2012) within the bank and insurance sec-
tors. In each of these studies, the inputs and outputs
to the DEA vectors are industry speciﬁc. For
example, in Murthi et al. (1996) the inputs include
product quality and product price, and the outputs
include market share. In the Leverty and Grace
(2012) insurance study, the inputs include adminis-
trative and agent labour, and the outputs include
the present value of real losses incurred for personal
and commercial short-tail lines. The study of
Demerjian et al. (2012), instead, measures efﬁciency
for a large cross section of ﬁrms, spanning most in-
dustries. In detail, they use as DEA input ﬁve stock
variables (net purchased ﬁxed assets, net operating
leases, net Research & Development, purchased
goodwill, and other intangible assets) and two ﬂow
variables (cost of inventory and selling &
1A similar approach has been used by Kweh et al. (2014b), aimed
to examine the relationship between corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) and corporate performance using a two-stage approach,
in the ﬁrst stage evaluating the efﬁciency and metafrontier frame-
work of companies in the US telecommunications industry, then
regressing CSR on the efﬁciency scores in the second stage.
3administrative expenses) to capture the choices
managers make in generating revenues (output).
Demerjian et al.’s (2012) study also differs from the
others because the authors modify the DEA gener-
ated ﬁrm efﬁciency measure by excluding from it
key ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that the authors ex-
pect to aid (ﬁrm size, market share, positive free
cash ﬂow, and ﬁrm age) or hinder management’s
efforts (complex multi-segment and international
operations), attributing the unexplained portion of
ﬁrm efﬁciency to management. The paper proposes
an MA measure that, coherently with Demerjian
et al. (2012) allows distinguishing the effect of the
manager from the effect of the ﬁrm and to obtain
an ordinal ranking of quality for the sampled ﬁrms
using a “two-stage SFA-DEA” approach described
in the following section.
As IC is considered “ﬁrm-speciﬁc” and “context-
speciﬁc” from the third stage IC researchers (Dumay,
2014; Guthrie et al., 2012),2 we decided to apply the
model to a speciﬁc industry, the banking sector, and
to a deﬁned context, the Italian context, one of the
largest European markets (Casu et al., 2004). Manag-
ing IC within the service sector is particularly rele-
vant (Bowen & Ford, 2002), and an IC approach is
particularly relevant in a peculiar service sector such
as banking sector, for the signiﬁcance that IC play in
such industry (Curado et al., 2014).
Moreover, to use of the “two-stage SFA-DEA”
approach make essential to choice of a sample of
ﬁrms within the same business sector, as ﬁrms have
to be comparable to presume that the processes that
transform tangible and intangible inputs into value
within a ﬁrm are similar.
Several studies employing efﬁciency methodol-
ogy (DEA or SFA) focused on the banking sector
(Avkiran, 2011; Battese et al., 2000; Casu et al.,
2004; Deville, 2009; Deville et al., 2014; Halkos &
Salamouris, 2004; Kao & Liu, 2014; Matthews,
2013; Seiford & Zhu, 1999; Wang et al., 2014;
Yalama & Coskun, 2007), also in Italy (Aiello &
Bonanno, 2013, 2016a, 2016b; Bonanno, 2014).
Nevertheless, to date, no study uses a two-stage
SFA-DEA approach to measure MA in banking sector.
THE “TWO-STAGE SFA-DEA” APPROACH
DEA is a highly sophisticated method of evaluating
and measuring organizational performance. It
allows to measure the relative productive efﬁ-
ciency of each member of a set of comparable or-
ganizational units (DMUs) based on a theoretical
optimal performance for each organization. DEA
evaluates the relative efﬁciencies of DMUs with-
out making any assumptions about the functional
relationship between inputs and outputs in these
units, and this is its strongest point and the rea-
son why DEA could be considered a new, more
suitable approach to evaluate the productivity of
intangible resources, hard to identify and to
model (Campisi & Costa, 2008). In the DEA, the
technical DMU efﬁciency is deﬁned with regards
to the other DMUs of the sample, with some units
lying on the efﬁciency frontier (efﬁciency measure
equal 1), some others below efﬁciency frontier (efﬁ-
ciency measure< 1).
Nevertheless, this approach is by no means with-
out limitations. One of the main limitations attrib-
uted to the method is that units could be below
the efﬁciency frontier exclusively for inefﬁciency
reasons.
To overcome this limit, some researchers prefer to
complement DEA with the method called stochastic
frontier approach (SFA). In detail, SFA is a paramet-
ric method which allows inference to be made on
the estimated parameters by assigning a distribu-
tion function to the error. Further classiﬁcation
distinguishes the stochastic methods from the deter-
ministic ones. The former takes into account that a
unit may stray from the efﬁcient frontier also owing
to reasons of a random nature and not only to
inefﬁciency.
The main advantage of SFA is due to the possi-
bility of breaking down the error in two parts,
the inefﬁciency and the random errors. Under this
proﬁle, SFA is preferable to the Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA), which supposes that the distance
from the frontier is explained entirely by inefﬁ-
ciency and it does not consider random errors
such as maybe, variables measurement errors, or
those due to unexpected events. A further advan-
tage of the SFA method is the possibility of inserting
a set of variables in the model that explain the
inefﬁcient component. In this way, SFA method
offers the guarantee to consider an exogenous
component of inefﬁciency in the estimation of the
frontier.
The methodology used by Fried et al. (2002) is one
of the most widely applied in studies keen to use
DEA overcoming its main limitation. The Fried
et al.’s methodology consists of three steps: in the
ﬁrst one the authors use DEA in order to estimate
the initial measure of ﬁrm performance; in the sec-
ond stage, the ﬁrst-stage performance measures
are regressed against a set of variables; in this way,
a decomposition of the variation in the performance
is obtained, which is formed of a part attributable to
environmental effects, a part due to managerial inef-
ﬁciency, and a part attributable to random errors;
2Originally, Petty and Guthrie (2000) outlined two stages associ-
ated with developing IC as a research ﬁeld. In the ﬁrst stage (from
the late 1980s to the early 1990s), efforts focused on raising aware-
ness of IC and understanding its potential for creating and man-
aging a sustainable competitive advantage. The second stage of
IC research (from the late 1990s to the early 2000s) dealt mainly
with the process of measuring and managing IC from a top-down
perspective. Guthrie et al. (2012) extended Petty and Guthrie’s
study to introduce a third stage in IC research (from 2004 until
now), focused on a critical examination of IC in practice (Veltri
& Bronzetti, 2015).
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evaluate the ﬁrm performance with adjusted inputs
(or outputs, depending on the orientation of ﬁrst
stage DEA).
The methodology used in this work is an alterna-
tive to the three-stage DEA SFA approach proposed
by Fried et al. (2002), in which we implement the
speciﬁcation proposed by Battese and Coelli
(1995), which allows to estimate the frontier model
and the inefﬁciency equation in a simultaneous
way. In this way, the ﬁrst and the second stages
shown by Fried et al. (2002) are incorporated in a
single one, and we estimate the efﬁciency scores
through a parametric method which, among other
things, takes into account also a random error and
not only the inefﬁciency detracting from the frontier
as in DEA. Our idea is to obtain an MAmeasure as a
residue of the inefﬁciency equation and to use it as a
new input to insert in the second stage when DEA is
set up. For these reasons, it would be appropriate to
call the methodology used in this study “two-stage
SFA-DEA”.
In particular, the methodology used in this work
can be described as follows:
1. The ﬁrst stage involves estimating simulta-
neously the cost frontier and the inefﬁciency
equation deﬁned in the system (1):
Costit ¼ C yit;wit
� �þ uit þ vit
uit ¼
XK
k¼1
ηk zitk þ eit
8>><>>: (1)
where Costit is the logarithm of total cost incurred
by the i-th bank at time t; yit represents the vector
of outputs obtained from the bank i in year t; wit is
the vector of input prices; βj and γn are the respective
parameters to be estimated; uit is an erratic compo-
nent that measures the inefﬁciency and is a non-
negative variable; vit is, instead, the random error.
Moreover, zit represents the vector of variables that
inﬂuence the i-th bank. Our interest is to obtain the
MA measure as residues of the inefﬁciency equation
and to introduce it in the DEA second stage
estimation.
2. The second stage consists in implementing the
DEA approach with another input, the MA esti-
mated in the previous step. DEA is the most used
non-parametric method in the literature of MA
(Demerjian et al., 2012; Hajiha & Ghilavi, 2012;
Leverty & Grace, 2012).
Let xi and qi be, respectively, the column vectors of
inputs and outputs, X and Q the input matrix and
the output matrix, the variable returns to scale
(VRS) linear programming problem can be written
as follows (Afriat, 1972; Banker et al., 1984; Battese
et al., 2005):
minθ;λ θ;
st � qi þQλ≥0;
θxi � Xλ≥0;
I1’λ ¼ 1
λ≥0
(2)
where θ is a scalar, λ is a I×1 vector of constants and
the third expression of (2) is the convexity
constraint.
THE SAMPLE: DATA AND VARIABLES
Data are from the ABI Banking Data, which pro-
vides the balance sheets of Italian banks from 1993
to the present. Moreover, some variables (for exam-
ple, bad loans calculated by geographical location of
customers) are taken from the BIP (“Base
Informativa Pubblica” online) released by the Bank
of Italy. The period covered by this analysis is
2006–2011. There were 686 banks in 2006, 692 in
2007, 689 in 2008, 686 in 2009, 648 in 2010, and
631 in the last year. The sample consists of mutual-
cooperative banks, henceforth MCBs (on average
63%), Ltd (on average 32%), and Popolari banks
(on average 6%). As can be seen, most of the banks
are small and minor (92% of the sample in 2006
and 94% in 2011). In addition, the proportion of
banks that have their main ofﬁce in the North is
60% of the sample. This is a much higher value than
that for banks that have their main ofﬁce in the
South (20%). In order to highlight some information
about the Italian Banking System, Table 1 reports the
distribution of Total Assets for geographical areas
and legal categories. As can be seen, this industry
is characterized by a breakdown and, for each
macro-area or legal class, banks have speciﬁc and
different characteristics.
With regard to the variables used in the econo-
metric analysis, in the extensive review proposed
by Berger and Humphrey (1997), it is argued that
the intermediation approach proposed by Sealey
and Lindley (1977) is the most appropriate to evalu-
ate ﬁnancial institutions. For these reasons, the
variables we include in the model are selected
according to this approach.
Although there is a heated debate about which
speciﬁcations of inputs and outputs to choose in
the study of bank performance, there is a certain
consensus in considering loans to customers (y1) as
the main banking output. We introduce another out-
put into the model, namely the non-interest income
(y2). This choice is justiﬁed by the fact that banks
nowadays offer a range of non-traditional “collat-
eral” services for which they obtain positive gains.
The third output used in this work is that of securi-
ties (y3), composed of loans to other banks, equities,
and bonds (Barra et al., 2011). With regard to inputs,
5we use labour, capital, and deposits. In the ﬁrst
stage, we use the input prices in order to estimate
the cost frontier, while in the second stage, we apply
a production frontier introducing a fourth input
given by the MA measure derived in the ﬁrst stage.
There are three traditional inputs: labour (x1) is mea-
sured as the number of employees of individual
banks; the cost of labour (w1) is calculated as the
ratio of personnel expenses to the number of
employees; the cost of capital (w2) is measured in
this work as the ratio of expenses that are not consid-
ered in the other input variables in the frontier model
and the banking product (x2). Therefore, the numer-
ator includes administrative expenses (excluding
personnel expenses), operating expenses, the interest
expense net of interest on amounts due to customers,
depreciation of ﬁxed assets, and commission ex-
penses. The administrative expenses include cost
items, such as those relating to electricity, rent, and
maintenance of various types (for details, see Aiello
& Bonanno, 2013). Finally, the third input considered
is given by the deposits from customers (x3) whose
cost (w3) is given by the ratio of interest paid to cus-
tomers and the total amount of deposits. The depen-
dent variable in the cost function, Cost(y,w), is the
total cost of individual banks, and this is calculated
as the sum of administrative expenses, interest
expense, operating expenses, commission expenses,
and depreciation of ﬁxed assets.
As already mentioned, the speciﬁcation made by
Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows the simulta-
neous estimation of equations of system (1),
implies a need to deﬁne the determinants of inefﬁ-
ciency. One environmental variable that explains
bank performance is credit quality (z1), which we
calculate as the ratio of non-performing loans to total
loans to customers. Both these variables are deﬁned
by customers’ geographical location and are taken
from the BIP of the Bank of Italy. The values of
the loans quality (z1) are linked to each observa-
tion through the deﬁnition of four geographical
macro-areas (Bonanno, 2014). In order to take into
account the bank’s risk position and the effect that
this may have on efﬁciency scores, an indicator of
bank solvency (z2) is introduced. This is calculated
as the ratio between regulatory capital and risk-
weighted assets and is a measure of banks’ capital
adequacy in relation to the credit risk. Furthermore,
this is calculated on a territorial level by considering
the same four macro-areas used for z1. It is also use-
ful to consider the weight of each bank within the in-
dustry and, in this sense, the Herﬁndahl index (z3),
has been adopted. For each geographical macro-
area, it is calculated as the sum of the squared mar-
ket share of each bank in the sample. This is an issue
which has been addressed in many works (Casu &
Girardone, 2009; Dongili et al., 2008; Fontani & Vitali,
2007), which have aimed at verifying whether a
higher concentration in the industry, such as has oc-
curred in the Italian banking sector since the 1990s,
can inﬂuence bank efﬁciency. In general, the out-
come is uncertain, since the operations of consolida-
tion have resulted in an increase in size with an eye
to probable and expected increases in efﬁciency
levels. On the other hand, this may cause an
increase in banks market power. Turati (2008) pro-
poses a model that captures the relationship
between proﬁtability and efﬁciency. The results sup-
port the idea of a competitive banking sector and, ac-
cording to the author, the consolidation operations
lead to an increase in banks’ bargaining power,
which is bad for customers. The ftse index (z4) is in-
troduced into the model in order to capture the rela-
tionship between the effects of the current crisis,
reﬂected in Stock Exchange transactions, and bank
efﬁciency (Bonanno, 2014). Moreover, a dummy for
each year of the analysed period is introduced in or-
der to consider a time effect on the efﬁciency scores.
This dummy is meant to capture what happened in
the years before and after the crisis, which reﬂects
phenomena which are different from those gauged
by the other z-variables. Finally, we have included
Table 1 Average values of Total Assets by geographic area and legal category (constant values in mln of euros—NIC
Index Istat, base year =1995)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Banks Total
Assets
Banks Total
Assets
Banks Total
Assets
Banks Total
Assets
Banks Total
Assets
Banks Total
Assets
Geographical area
North-West 151 6011 149 6955 144 8210 152 7464 138 5762 129 6370
North-East 241 1636 242 1884 242 1877 239 2045 231 2883 230 3020
Centre 151 3250 150 3106 154 3238 150 3381 144 3182 139 3418
South 143 725 151 701 149 712 145 768 135 742 133 736
Legal category
LTD 218 7327 218 7845 222 8593 233 8082 207 8001 193 8879
MCB 431 241 436 257 428 278 414 301 406 318 404 328
POP 37 5276 39 6368 39 5506 39 6001 35 6689 34 7154
Total 686 2764 692 2983 689 3253 686 3268 648 3177 631 3312
Source: Own elaboration on ABI data.
6some dummy variables in order to take into account
the fact that any difference in the levels of cost
efﬁciency may be determined by legal category, geo-
graphical location, and/or size of banks.
MAIN FINDINGS
In this section are reported the results of both the
stages.
First stage: results from SFA
The translog cost function for the banking sector is
estimated as a system of equations. The aspects of
the ﬁrm’s behavior that we observe are total cost,
the allocation of total cost across the various inputs
(i.e. input expenditure shares), the ﬁrm’s output
level, and the input prices that the ﬁrm faces. The
translog function allows for both positive and nega-
tive scale effects, that is, average cost can both de-
crease and increase across the range of the cost
function. Moreover, the translog function is more
ﬂexible than the Cobb–Douglas form. The elasticity
of cost with respect to output is the ratio of marginal
to average cost.
Essentially, this allows the observable informa-
tion about the behaviour of the ﬁrm such as total
resources expenditures, the distribution of these
expenditures across inputs, the output yielded by
these expenditures, and the resources prices faced
by the ﬁrm all to be used in the estimation of the
parameters of the model.
In Table 2, there is the estimation of the cost fron-
tier for the Italian banking system over the period
2006–2011. All the coefﬁcients of our model for the
translog cost function are signiﬁcant.
Table 3 shows the cost inefﬁciency equation for
the Italian Banking system (2006–2011). All the coef-
ﬁcients are signiﬁcant. It is worth noticing that the
coefﬁcient for “Bad Loans” has a positive sign. This
means that the higher the incidence of suffering (or,
in other words the lower the credit quality of the ter-
ritorial area where the bank has its main ofﬁce), the
higher are the values for estimated inefﬁciency.
The coefﬁcient of the “Solvency Ratio” has,
instead, a negative sign. If banks have high solvency
ratio, the lower the risk to which they are subject the
lower the level of inefﬁciency that they register.
Interesting information is also provided by the
coefﬁcient of Herﬁndhal’s index that has a negative
sign. This means that Banks in which the concentra-
tion of Total Assets (relatively to their main ofﬁce) is
higher reached the highest levels of efﬁciency.
Another aspect to be highlighted is that the coefﬁ-
cient of FTSE index has a negative sign. This signals
a pro-cyclical trend in efﬁciency.
The highest cost efﬁciency values are achieved by
MCBs and by Banks with the main ofﬁce in
North-East. The efﬁciency levels are higher in small
Banks than in major ones, but minor, medium, and
large Banks achieve cost efﬁciency levels higher
than the small ones.3
These results are quite interesting and sometimes
surprising such as the one that smaller banks are
more efﬁcient than bigger banks (Aiello & Bonanno,
2013; Bonanno, 2014), but for our aim the most
Table 2 Estimates for the cost frontier of Italian banks (2006–2011)
Coefﬁcients SE z-Value p-Value Coefﬁcients SE z-Value p-Value
β0 �5.44*** 0.580 �9.38 0 γ11 �0.05*** 0.015 �5.94 0
β1 0.73*** 0.005 14.96 0 γ12 �0.004 0.024 �0.35 0.72
β2 �0.20*** 0.059 �3.32 0 γ22 0.05*** 0.012 8.06 0
β3 0.38*** 0.056 6.92 0 α11 �0.06*** 0.006 �9.20 0
γ1 1.60*** 0.124 12.91 0 α12 0.07*** 0.008 8.58 0
γ2 0.03 0.099 0.35 0.72 α13 �0.02* 0.008 �2.39 0.02
β11 0.04*** 0.002 42.74 0 α21 0.07*** 0.004 14.02 0
β12 �0.06*** 0.006 �21.08 0 α22 �0.05*** 0.008 �6.67 0
β13 �0.03*** 0.006 �10.84 0 α23 �0.002*** 0.007 �0.37 0
β22 0.03*** 0.004 12.40 0
β23 0.02*** 0.007 4.68 0 Sigma
2 119.43* 49.68 2.40 0.02
β33 0.01*** 0.004 3.82 0 Gamma 0.9997*** 0.0001 7805.44 0
Log-likelihood 363.15
Source: Own elaboration on ABI data.
Signiﬁcance levels:
***= 0.001;
**= 0.01;
*= 0.05.
sigma2 = σ2u + σ
2
v; this is composed of the error variance, given by the sum of the variances of the two components.
gamma= σ2u / σ
2; the zero value of this parameter indicates that deviations from the frontier are only due to random error, while values
close to one of the range entail that the distance from the border is due to inefﬁciency. This parameter, in the technique of Jondrow
et al. (1982), is used to separate the component of inefﬁciency (JLMS technique).
3In this estimation, BCCs are the group of control for the legal cat-
egory. Banks that have the main ofﬁce in North-Eastern Italy are
the group of control for the geographical side.
7important issue is the following one. We obtain that
the erratic component uit, the share of the composite
error that measures inefﬁciency, has been “cleaned
up” from some sources of inefﬁciency (bad loans,
solvency, etc.), then we can use the residual of the
inefﬁciency equation as an acceptable proxy to
signal MA.
Second stage: results from DEA
In the second stage, we apply DEA under the
hypotheses of both Constant Return to Scale (CRS)
and Variable Return to Scale (VRS). The assumption
of VRS seems to explain better some features of the
organization studied, but it is useful to conduct a
CRS and a VRS DEA upon the same data since
doing it this way allows us to decompose the techni-
cal efﬁciency (TE) scores obtained into two compo-
nents, one due to scale inefﬁciency and one due to
“pure” technical inefﬁciency (i.e. wrong input mix
or managerial inefﬁciency). If we have a difference
between the two TE scores for a speciﬁc observation
(or Decision Making Unit) this indicates that the
Decision Making Unit has scale inefﬁciency. When
this happens, we can calculate this inefﬁciency
using the difference between the VRS TE score and
the CRS TE score.4
4The result of the two tests (one for CRS, one for VRS) is available
on request (in the case of CRS, the t-statistic is equal to 29.10,
while in the case of VRS, it is equal to 25.58).
Table 4 Estimated DEA for the Full Sample with and without MA’s measure as new input of the production function
2006 2007 2008
CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS
Full sample—no MA as input 0.9004 0.9090 0.8980 0.9076 0.9000 0.9087
0.0400 0.0434 0.0387 0.0436 0.0393 0.0431
Full sample—MA as input 0.9064 0.9133 0.9096 0.9161 0.9174 0.9230
0.0411 0.0443 0.0417 0.0456 0.0430 0.0457
Nr. of observations 475 495 525
2009 2010 2011
CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS
Full sample—no MA as input 0.8980 0.9070 0.8887 0.8974 0.8943 0.9048
0.0357 0.0401 0.0366 0.0410 0.0368 0.0406
Full sample—MA as input 0.9093 0.9157 0.8994 0.9062 0.8997 0.9082
0.0383 0.0418 0.0394 0.0421 0.0367 0.0403
Nr. of observations 500 472 481
Source: Own elaboration on ABI data.
Table 3 Inefﬁciency equation estimates for Italian banks (2006–2011)
Coefﬁcients SE z-Value p-Value
z1= bad loans 615.77* 255.99 2.41 0.02
z2= solvency index �868.05* 358.46 �2.42 0.02
z3=Herﬁndahl index �2875.70* 1188.70 �2.42 0.02
z4= ftse �0.03* 0.01 �2.40 0.02
d2006 �105.64* 43.59 �2.42 0.02
d2007 �73.35* 30.50 �2.40 0.02
d2008 �859.18* 358.84 �2.39 0.02
d2009 163.84* 68.19 2.40 0.02
d2010 121.89* 50.35 2.42 0.02
d_ltd 684.34* 284.65 2.40 0.02
d_pop 892.63* 371.70 2.40 0.02
d_minor �65.13* 27.14 �2.40 0.02
d_med �402.49* 167.74 �2.40 0.02
d_large �170.87* 70.71 �2.42 0.02
d_major 152.38* 64.37 2.37 0.02
d_nw 607.00* 252.54 2.40 0.02
d_centre 262.75* 109.70 2.40 0.02
d_south 144.99* 61.00 2.38 0.02
Signiﬁcance levels:
***= 0.001;
**= 0.01;
*= 0.05.
Source: Own elaboration on ABI data.
8In Table 4, there are the efﬁciency scores esti-
mated with DEA without and with the MA mea-
sure as new input of the production function.
The standard errors are in italics. We performed
a test on the differences between means, and
we widely reject the null hypotheses of equality.
This result allows us to consider the MA as a
signiﬁcant variable to be introduced in the esti-
mate of a production function with the DEA
approach.
The average efﬁciency scores of Table 4 show that
when we consider the additional input of MA the
efﬁciency results improve. This happens for all the
years and for all the observations. The magnitude
of improvement is different in different years.
Figure 1 shows the trend in the estimated average
Efﬁciency Score. It is clear from the ﬁgure that
including MA as an input gives us better scores. It
means that MA has a positive impact on the efﬁ-
ciency of the sample. The trend is increasing from
2006 until 2008, it decreases in 2009 and 2010, and
slightly improves for 2011.
In Figure 2, we can observe the magnitude of
improvement given by MA. This value is calculated
as the differences between the efﬁciency score
obtained without this input and the efﬁciency score
obtained including in theestimation theproxyofMA.
Figure 1 Trend in the average estimated DEA—full sample
with and without MA’s measure (VRS)
Figure 2 Impact of MA (full sample)
Table 5 Estimated DEA efﬁciency scores of with MA’s measure as input—Full sample—Legal Category—Size
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS
All sample
Obs 0.9064 0.9133 0.9096 0.9161 0.9174 0.9230 0.9093 0.9157 0.8994 0.9062 0.8997 0.9082
0.0411 0.0443 0.0417 0.0456 0.0430 0.0457 0.0383 0.0418 0.0394 0.0421 0.0367 0.0403
475 495 525 500 472 481
Legal category
Ltd Obs 0.9249 0.9415 0.9374 0.9530 0.9516 0.9630 0.9313 0.9480 0.9197 0.9362 0.9099 0.9321
0.0342 0.0363 0.0275 0.0301 0.0313 0.0303 0.0298 0.0325 0.0377 0.0366 0.0375 0.0397
112 118 131 120 111 120
Pop Obs 0.9287 0.9415 0.9492 0.9627 0.9613 0.9727 0.9453 0.9518 0.9348 0.9488 0.9228 0.9351
0.0288 0.0344 0.0244 0.0261 0.0345 0.0331 0.0373 0.0385 0.0413 0.0398 0.0402 0.0445
26 27 33 29 25 24
MCB
Obs
0.8985 0.9017 0.8971 0.9000 0.9011 0.9039 0.8987 0.9017 0.8900 0.8931 0.8944 0.8977
0.0414 0.0422 0.0403 0.0412 0.0370 0.0379 0.0359 0.0367 0.0357 0.0365 0.0347 0.0355
337 350 361 351 336 337
Size
Minor Obs 0.9021 0.9056 0.9019 0.9056 0.9086 0.9123 0.9021 0.9056 0.8934 0.8967 0.8968 0.9006
0.0428 0.0436 0.0411 0.0428 0.0413 0.0428 0.0372 0.0384 0.0383 0.0392 0.0368 0.0378
366 379 408 383 365 378
Small Obs 0.9141 0.9273 0.9299 0.9412 0.9446 0.9525 0.9295 0.9403 0.9145 0.9267 0.9046 0.9237
0.0314 0.0351 0.0346 0.0374 0.0360 0.0360 0.0338 0.0356 0.0377 0.0334 0.0358 0.0346
82 80 83 74 74 76
Medium Obs 0.9256 0.9595 0.9341 0.9656 0.9450 0.9704 0.9310 0.9636 0.9201 0.9570 0.9147 0.9618
0.0144 0.0194 0.0155 0.0214 0.0244 0.0218 0.0202 0.0210 0.0215 0.0212 0.0225 0.0210
23 24 26 24 23 22
Large Obs 0.9574 0.9784 0.9631 0.9824 0.9772 0.9907 0.9559 0.9784 0.9509 0.9794 0.9478 0.9783
0.0217 0.0138 0.0162 0.0135 0.0191 0.0123 0.0200 0.0158 0.0206 0.0153 0.0182 0.0137
8 6 7 7 8 5
Major Obs 0.9703 0.9968 0.9906 0.999986 0.9900 1 0.9868 0.9966 0.9948 1 0.9637 1
0.0029 0.0045 0.0064 0.00003 0.0150 0 0.0104 0.0029 0.0073 0 0.0062 0
2 4 4 3 2 2
Source: Own elaboration on ABI data.
9The highest value is observed in 2008; years 2007,
2009, and 2010 show a similar value of the impact of
MA on efﬁciency while the minimum is observed in
year 2011.
In particular, when we consider MA as input, in
2008 in which the ﬁnancial crisis was registered,
we obtain an increase in the average efﬁciency.
This can clarify the importance of considering this
variable. Evidently, a part of efﬁciency explained
by MA positively contributes also in the case of
crisis.
Table 5 reports the estimated efﬁciency when
we introduce the MA measure as input. We show
the results disaggregated for legal category and
size. Also, in this table, the standard errors are in
italics.5
As can be seen, in the case of VRS, we obtain an
increase of estimated efﬁciencies, but trends remain
substantially unchanged. When we disaggregate for
legal category, we ﬁnd that Popolari Banks perform
better than Ltds and MCBs and that the latter regis-
ter the worst results. As regards the size, it easy to
realize that the largest Banks achieve the higher
levels and that with decreasing size also the esti-
mated values decrease. These results conﬁrm the
existence of a strong heterogeneity within the Italian
Banking System.
We are able to reproduce Table 5 when estimat-
ing a stochastic cost frontier in the ﬁrst stage. We
chose not to include it because it does not corre-
spond to the focus of the paper. However, on the
SF cost side, CCBs perform better than the others
one, while Ltds are placed in the same intermedi-
ate position with respect to what happens when
estimating the production function through DEA.
Regarding the size, we ﬁnd a conﬂicting result
because in this case we obtain that the minor
banks are positioned in ﬁrst place with the highest
levels of cost efﬁciency, whereas the major banks
are in last place. The ranking remains unchanged
with respect to the other banks (small, medium,
and large).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
The article focuses on the measurement of a relevant
component of the human capital, the MA, and the
paper aims to ﬁnd a measure, better than existing
ones, that allows distinguishing the effect of the
manager from the effect of the ﬁrm in creating ﬁrm
value.
Quantifying MA is central to management litera-
ture. Most of the measures used in the literature re-
ﬂect signiﬁcant aspects of the ﬁrm that are outside
of management’s control. The originality of the pa-
per consists in the proposition of a new model to
measure MA, which outperforms the alternative
measures of MA, simple to use, and based on easily
obtainable ﬁnancial data and available for a broad
cross section of ﬁrms. The paper aims to exploit
the possibility of measuring the impact of MA on
technical efﬁciency.
To do this, we use a sophisticated approach to the
classical three-stage estimation, in which both Data
Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Ap-
proach are used to estimate the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency
scores. This allows us to derive a measure of MA.
The method used is a “two-stage SFA-DEA” ap-
proach. Our measure of MA is the “clean” part of
the residue of the inefﬁciency equation of Stochastic
Frontier Approach, and we use it as a new input in
the “second/third” Data Envelopment Analysis
stage. We observed an improvement in efﬁciency
scores calculated with this new input for all years
and for all the average samples. This can be seen
as a proxy of positive impact of MA on technical ef-
ﬁciency. We believe that our proxy of MA score ex-
hibits an economically signiﬁcant manager-speciﬁc
component and contains less noise than existing
proxies of MA. This more precise measure of ability
allows a wide array of studies that previously were
difﬁcult to conduct.
An interesting topic for further research can be to
develop a “behaviour” model for inefﬁcient ﬁrms.
Since we estimate a technical efﬁciency frontier, the
Observations (Decision Making Units—DMU) on
the Frontier can be seen as “fashionable” DMU for
all the DMU that are not fully efﬁcient (not on the
Frontier). In this way, all the frontier DMU can be
treated as “peer”. “Peers” deﬁne the relevant part
of the production frontier for a DMU. If a DMU is
not fully efﬁcient, given the previous and following
estimation, we can calculate which is the target (i.e.
produced output given the used inputs) that the
DMU could aim at, if efﬁcient. An example will
make it clear (see Figure 3). Output Z can be pro-
duced using two inputs y and x. The points on the
5In this stage, we exclude banks that register SFA-efﬁciency
scores with a standard deviation greater than 0.10 between 2006
and 2011 (27 observations). Moreover, DEA requests a full matrix
of values; therefore, the ﬁnal number of observations, for this
step, is 2948.
Figure 3 Frontier and peers
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iso-product curve (A, C, E, and F—let us not con-
sider D yet) are DMUs producing the quantity Z of
output in an efﬁcient way, using different technolo-
gies (the vectors departing from the origin indicate
the input combinations). DMU B produces the
quantity Z using a sub-optimal technology. If DMUs
on the frontier have a Technical Efﬁciency score of 1,
B will have a smaller Technical Efﬁciency score, i.e.
0.8. This means that for that DMU could be possible
to reduce the consumption of all inputs by 20%
without reducing output. If we draw a vector be-
tween the origin of the axis and B, the vector will
cross the production frontier at the point D. D can
be seen as an ideal ﬁrm that uses the same technol-
ogy of B but efﬁciently (it uses less inputs for the
same quantity of output). D could be ﬁrm B using
its technology efﬁciently. Point D can be obtained
as a linear combination of point A and C. A and C
will be the “peers” ﬁrms of B.
Since we can have a proxy of MA as an input (and
for all inputs), we can calculate a “weight” for each
peer and for each input, and also for MA. The
weight obtained for each input, in each estimate
and for each “peer” is “the importance” of that ﬁrm
as a peer in the linear combination (i.e. in the exam-
ple D is at the same distance between A and C so the
weight of these two peers will be, i.e. 0.5 and 0.5. If
D was very close to A, the weight would be 0.90 for
A and 0.10 for C).
Our approach can give some useful direction to
non-efﬁcient DMU in the changes needed in each in-
put (including MA) to achieve full efﬁciency, and
this can be an interesting starting point for a new
work. The idea emerging also from the Figure 3 is
that the management can read our empirical results
in the direction of reducing the ﬁrm inputs without
reducing its outputs or increasing the outputs with
the same level of inputs. It is a useful tool to address
the managerial decisions. Not only, being able to ob-
tain a measure of MA, managers can use it for a sort
of self-assessment.
In the future there is also scope for a further paper
that would review the overall literature relating to
DEA approaches and provide some detailed discus-
sion of the overall managerial implications of such
analytic work, as this type of broader analysis is
lacking with respect to the development of IC
management.
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